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I. INTRODUCTION
I would like to thank Dean Joseph Kearney and Professor Kali
Murray, who invited me to give this lecture, and also the faculty of
Marquette Law School for hosting me these few days.
I especially appreciate being given the chance to deliver a lecture
† Audio of the Thirteenth Annual Honorable Helen Wilson Nies Memorial Lecture in
Intellectual Property Law, delivered at Marquette University Law School on October 21,
2009, is available at http://law.marquette.edu/cgi-bin/site.pl?2130&pageID=919. This lecture
is delivered each year by a nationally recognized scholar in the field of intellectual property
law. The remarks have been edited to reflect subsequent developments.
* Oswald Symister Colclough Research Professor of Law, George Washington
University Law School.
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named in honor of Judge Helen Nies, as I am a great fan of her work in
1
2
the patent area. Indeed, a recent article of mine traces the Supreme
Court’s reengagement in the patent area to the Court’s grant of
3
certiorari in American Airlines v. Lockwood, in which Judge Nies wrote
a marvelous dissenting opinion at the Court of Appeals. Her dissent
reads very much like a thoughtful and considered brief that was trying
to attract Supreme Court review. She focused on a split in circuit
authority on the issue in the case and articulated with great expertise the
4
reasons why the issue was important. In a subsequent law review
article, Judge Nies explicitly stated her belief that dissents from Federal
Circuit opinions could “provide[] an impetus for Supreme Court
review,” as “[j]udges disputing a point more likely will pique the Court’s
5
interest than lawyers disputing a point.” She also defended the value of
dissenting opinions, stating her conviction that “a judge who disagrees
with the majority must make the effort to write a dissent, especially here
at the Federal Circuit where dissents are virtually the sole means by
which contradicting positions on the law are presented fully and without
6
personal bias to the Supreme Court.”
Judge Nies’s dissent in Lockwood was a signal moment in modern
patent law, as it marked a watershed in the Federal Circuit’s
relationship to the Supreme Court. The Court’s decision in 1994 to

1. During her time as an active sitting Federal Judge from 1980–1994, Judge Nies
authored more than 100 opinions on patent related matters. She also wrote a number of law
review articles related to intellectual property matters including: Secondary Meaning: An
Historical Note, 64 TRADEMARK REP. 247 (1974); The Federal Circuit: A Court for the
Future, 41 AM. U.L. REV. 571 (1992); and Dissents at the Federal Circuit and Supreme Court
Review, 45 AM. U.L. REV. 1519 (1996) [hereinafter Nies, Dissents at the Federal Circuit]. I am
also a fan of Judge Nies’s choice in law clerks. Her former clerk Craig Nard, now a professor
at Case Western but once a professor here at Marquette (see the faculty profile for Craig A.
Nard
at
the
Case
Western
Reserve
University
School
of
Law,
http://law.case.edu/FacultyResearch/MeetOurFaculty/FacultyDetail.aspx?id=139 (last visited
Dec. 8, 2009)), is a fine scholar and an excellent co-author. See, e.g., Craig Allen Nard &
John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1619
(2007); Thomas G. Field, Jr., Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Dickinson v. Zurko: An
Amicus Brief, 4 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 49 (2000).
2. John F. Duffy, The Federal Circuit in the Shadow of the Solicitor General, 78 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 518, 523 (2010) [hereinafter Duffy, Federal Circuit].
3. See American Airlines v. Lockwood, 515 U.S. 1211 (1995) (order granting
certiorari); 515 U.S. 1182 (1995) (order vacating the Federal Circuit’s decision and remanding
the case to the district court).
4. In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966, 980 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Nies, J., dissenting from denial of
en banc rehearing).
5. Nies, Dissents at the Federal Circuit, supra note 1, at 1520.
6. Id. at 1527.
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grant certiorari in Lockwood ushered in a period of renewed interest by
the high court on patent law issues. In the first twelve years after the
creation of the Federal Circuit (1982–1994), the Supreme Court heard
only five patent cases, and those cases were only tangentially related to
7
substantive patent issues. Starting in 1994 and continuing to the
present day, the Supreme Court has considered, on average, at least one
patent law case per term, with the majority of the cases involving core
8
matters of patent policy.
I have devoted attention to Judge Nies’s dissent in Lockwood not
merely because it is appropriate to recall the great jurist after whom this
lecture was named, but also because my lecture today may be viewed as
a dissent to some of the current approaches in modern patent law. Like
Judge Nies, I too believe in the inherent value of dissent. While
agreement can be signified with mere silence, disagreement imposes a
responsibility to speak and to write, for only then can “contradicting
positions” be fully and carefully presented.
The title for my lecture today is “Innovation and Recovery.” The
lecture is premised on the undeniable fact that our nation has recently
7. See Duffy, Federal Circuit, supra note 2, at 522; John F. Duffy, The Festo Decision
and the Return of the Supreme Court to the Bar of Patents, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 273, 297
(2002).
8. See Duffy, Federal Circuit, supra note 2, at 523–24. Ironically, although Judge
Nies’s dissent in Lockwood was successful in attracting the Supreme Court’s attention to
patent issues, she was ultimately unsuccessful in having the Court review the issue on which
she dissented. The issue in Lockwood concerned the allocation of power between judge and
jury in deciding issues of patent validity. The patentee Lockwood sued American Airlines for
patent infringement and demanded a jury trial. See Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 968. American
Airlines counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment of patent invalidity. See id. The district
court granted American’s motion for summary judgment as to Lockwood’s patent
infringement claims. With the issue of patent validity the only dispute remaining, the district
court denied Lockwood’s demand for a jury trial, holding that “the remaining claims are
equitable in nature [and] the plaintiff [Lockwood] is not entitled to a trial by jury as a matter
of right.” Id. at 969 (quoting the district court’s ruling). After Lockwood obtained a reversal
of the district court’s ruling, American Airlines successfully petitioned for certiorari on the
issue whether the right to a jury trial applies in such circumstances. Lockwood then withdrew
his demand for a jury trial. The issue on which the Court had granted certiorari had thus
become moot, and the Court merely vacated the Federal Circuit’s decision and remanded the
case to the district court. See 515 U.S. 1182 (1995). In the fifteen years since Lockwood, the
Supreme Court has never again granted certiorari on any of the important issues surrounding
the jury’s role in determining patent validity, though the Court has had the opportunity to do
so. See, e.g., Petition for a Writ of Certiorari in Medela AG v. Kinetic Concepts, No. 09-198
(filed
Aug.
13,
2009),
available
at
http://www.patentlyo.com/medela_20v._20kinetic_20petition_20for_20cert_20final.pdf;
Medela AG v. Kinetic Concepts, 130 S. Ct. 624 (2009) (order denying certiorari). Hopefully,
the Supreme Court will eventually resolve the split in authority that gave rise to Judge Nies’s
dissent.
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suffered a recession. We now hope for recovery. Yet despite all the
difficulties imposed by a recession, and despite our strongest desires to
have it retreat into history, a recession also has great value to society.
This value goes beyond mere clichéd paraphrases of the famous advice
attributed to Nicolo Machiavelli, “Never waste the opportunities
10
offered by a good crisis.” The opportunities afforded by a recession
are not merely the chance to seize power or to achieve other political
objectives. Recession provides the chance to learn and to change. Most
importantly, recession provides a lesson in the fallibility of human
knowledge and in the need for continued improvement.
Recession is failure. It is a failure of existing ways of doing things.
Regulatory structures fail; businesses fail; and individuals fail to
maintain their productivity and to meet their responsibilities. Precisely
because existing practices have failed, the way out of a recession is the
new, the changed, the innovative. Recovery from recession demands
new practices and new organizations for governments, businesses, and
individuals, and those reorganizations and reemployments are often
quite different from what came before. Recovery thus demands
innovation to rebuild society—to rebuild it a little bit better and,
hopefully, a little bit more carefully.
11
Innovation is therefore a natural response to a crisis.
In good
times, it makes sense to follow worn paths. If current methods are
yielding good results, it makes perfect sense to continue in those ways.
Not so in times of crisis. The innovation necessary for an economic
recovery is, to be sure, not just the innovation that goes on inside a
laboratory or a research facility. It can be bigger and more dramatic—
like the reorganization of an entire industry’s business and regulatory
practices. It can be smaller and more incremental, as when a single
individual decides to change careers or to open a new business.

9. See, e.g., Recovery Remains Fragile, Fed Chief Says, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2009, at B7;
Neil Irwin & Renae Merle, Economy Limping Back to Strength; ‘Slow-Motion Recovery’ Fed:
Return to Normal May Take 5 or 6 Years, WASH. POST, Nov. 25, 2009, at A1; Good News
From Near and Far Boosts Stocks, WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 2009, at G5.
10. Katharine Q. Seelye, A Different Emanuel for One Church, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17,
2009, available at http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/17/a-different-emanuel-for-onechurch/ (attributing the quote to Machiavelli). This quote became famous in 2008 and 2009
because two of President Obama’s advisors employed paraphrases of it. See id. (quoting
Rahm Emanuel and Hillary Clinton as employing slightly different paraphrases of the
original).
11. See Timothy Hay, Investors See Crisis Ebbing, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11, 2009 (relating
the comments of a venture capitalist that invention has not slowed in spite of the recession).
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Examining the innovation necessary for recovery yields two
important insights into the nature of innovation. First, innovation is
wildly diverse; it spans the full breadth of human activities and human
creativity. Second, innovation—or at least the innovation most ardently
sought as the path for recovery—is intensely practical. My thesis in this
lecture is that these two insights, though derived from our broader
experience, are essential in obtaining recovery for our chief legal
mechanism that is designed to foster innovation, the patent system.
II. INNOVATION FOR RECOVERY
Many patented innovations are incremental advances that build on
pre-existing technologies in relatively standard ways. Recognizing this
truth does not denigrate the value of those innovations and certainly
does not suggest that they should be denied patent protection. Even on
the forefront of scientific research, “normal science” usually dominates,
12
with valuable but incremental additions to existing structures. The
most innovative of advances—changes that are truly “outside the box”
in the sense that they reject pre-existing notions—are rare and episodic.
Yet it is precisely those sorts of transformative changes, both large and
small, that are the most necessary to generate a recovery from economic
failure. The crisis of economic failure makes complete rejection of old
ways easier, and the desire for recovery spurs creation of the boldly
new.
The period during which recession turns to recovery is thus an
optimal time to reconsider the nature and desirability of innovation, and
great insight can be won by considering the types of innovations sought
in time of crisis. These innovations are distinguished by their diversity
but unified by their practicality. These two qualities—diversity and
practicality—will provide my overarching themes.
A. The Diversity of Innovation
Recession and recovery remind us of the extreme diversity among
innovations. That diversity spans much more than advances in engines,
semi-conductor chips, chemicals, pharmaceuticals and computer
software. Such industrial diversity may be a common proxy for
13
representing the diversity of innovation, but it covers only a part of
innovation. Innovation extends beyond the research laboratory; it
12. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962).
13. See, e.g., Brian Kahin, Patents and Diversity in Innovation, 13 MICH. TELECOMM.
TECH. L. REV. 389, 394 (2007).

DUFFY 5-17-10

5/19/2010 2:23 PM

242 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:2

ranges from the individual home, to the corporate boardroom, and, yes,
even to inside the Beltway. Here, I will consider three types of
innovation that are often neglected in discussions about innovation but
yet are vital parts of the innovation needed for recovery.
1. Economic Innovation
First, let us consider the full scope of economic innovation. As I
have suggested, economic failure is an invitation to innovate. Failed
14
businesses recover through reorganizations of assets. Indeed, modern
corporate bankruptcy law is often not called bankruptcy, but corporate
15
reorganization.
That name is accurate precisely because business
failure creates the opportunity to take assets being used in one way,
which was unproductive, and put them to a new and hopefully
16
productive use. Such a common and seemingly trivial change demands
innovation in the sense that at least those specific assets are put to a use
that is new.
Innovation is present not only in any corporate reorganization, but
also in any individual’s search for reemployment. For the unemployed
in a recession, especially the newly unemployed, the job market often
seems bleak. Yet the lesson of a foreboding job market—and it is no
doubt a hard lesson on a personal level—is a lesson in the essential need
for innovation. When traditional career paths are no longer open and
promising, job seekers must be more creative. They must consider new
ways to work. They must search for new opportunities because the old
opportunities are diminished or gone altogether. It is common in our
society to admire the innovator and the entrepreneur. Yet the
unemployed share a common bond with innovators. For both, creativity
is essential, but the path is as difficult and fraught with failure as it is
essential.
Finally, any discussion of economic innovation is incomplete without
also considering those who are not bankrupt or unemployed, but who
instead have assets or capital despite the recession. It might seem at
14. See, e.g., MARK D. ROE, CORPORATE REORGANIZATION AND BANKRUPTCY 18
(2000) (noting that under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, a corporate reorganization
allows “the ownership interests in the [company] will be reallocated.”); Robert C. Clark, The
Interdisciplinary Study of Legal Evolution, 90 YALE L.J. 1238, 1250–54 (1981) (tracing the
development of corporate reorganizations under bankruptcy laws).
15. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations,
101 HARV. L. REV. 775, 775–77 (1988); Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate
Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL STUDIES 127, 138–39 (1986).
16. See, e.g., MICHAEL A. GERBER, BUSINESS REORGANIZATIONS 597–607 (2d ed.
Lexis pub. 2000) (providing a brief overview of a Chapter 11 reorganization plan procedure).

DUFFY 5-17-10

2010]

5/19/2010 2:23 PM

INNOVATION AND RECOVERY

243

first blush that these individuals and corporations should shun risk
during recessionary times; they should “play it safe.” But this is not so.
For those with assets, a recession is also a challenge, and a challenge to
innovate. For the well-off, recession also brings opportunity. Corporate
reorganizations bring the opportunity to purchase properties at
substantial discounts. Unemployment brings the opportunity to hire
previously unavailable talent that is now looking for new employment,
new directions, and new things to do.
This discussion should make clear the full scope of economic
innovation revealed by the process of recession and recovery.
Innovation ranges from the small—for example, a new shop on one
particular corner in Milwaukee, or a new career path for a single
individual—to the large—such as an entirely new business model, a new
product or pioneering technology. Economic innovation presents a
large continuum from the very smallest changes to the very largest pathbreaking developments.
2. Regulatory Innovation
Regulatory innovation is a second class of innovation that, though
often overlooked in general discussions on innovation, gains due
attention during a period of recession. By “regulatory innovation,” I
refer not merely to governmental regulation but instead to the vast
swath of mechanisms by which public and private institutions organize
and regulate human productivity. For the advocates of governmental
ordering—the champions of the Beltway—the recession is (or at least
should be) a challenge to existing assumptions about governmental
regulation because the existing machinery of government may have
failed. So too, for the advocates of private order, recession presents the
possibility that the existing institutional machinery of the private sphere
may have failed.
The need for recovery, and hope for avoiding calamity in the future,
thus typically prompts calls for public and private regulatory innovation.
In Washington, this innovative impulse may take the form of new
17
legislation or new administrative initiatives. Change is not, however,
17. See, e.g., S. 3217, 111th Cong., 2nd Sess. (2010) (April 29, 2010 version), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgiin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_bills&docid=f:s3217as.txt.pdf (financial reform legislation
proposed by Senator Dodd in response to the financial crisis); Securities and Exchange
Commission, Amendments to Regulation SHO, 75 Fed. Reg. 11232, 11233 (2010) (announcing
amendments to “short sale” rules and justifying the rules partly on the basis of recent
“market turmoil” including “the subprime mortgage crisis and credit crisis in 2007”);
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limited to the public sphere. Private firms must also evaluate the causes
of failure and seek worthwhile innovations. The private order must also
discover or invent new ways to make sure that firms seek productivity
and profit and not court risk and disaster.
3. Governmental Innovation
The final and highest level of innovation that I will discuss is
governmental innovation. It is now fashionable in Washington to talk
18
about Government 2.0. The name derives directly from an analogy to
19
The driving
the latest internet innovations, often called web 2.0.
theory behind Government 2.0 is that innovative information
technologies have the power to transform government—to create
government anew. The movement was recently the subject of a major
20
21
conference in Washington, and the new administration is a big fan.
Thus, inside the Beltway, the topic has become as ubiquitous as it is
notorious.
The current fascination with Government 2.0 should not, however,
obscure the long tradition from which the movement descends. The

Securities and Exchange Commission, Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, 75 Fed.
Reg. 3594, 3594 (2010) (announcing “a broad review of the current equity market structure”
with the goal of “determin[ing] whether regulatory initiatives to improve the current equity
market structure are needed”).
18. See, e.g., John D. Sutter, Cities Embrace Mobile Apps, ‘Gov 2.0,’ CNN.COM, Dec.
29, 2009, available at http://www.cnn.com/2009/TECH/12/28/government.web.apps/index.html
(discussing the Government 2.0 movement); Connect with Government, USA.GOV, Dec. 22,
2009, available at http://www.usa.gov/Topics/Multimedia.shtml (providing a directory of
websites allowing the public to access governmental blogs, twitter posting, YouTube videos,
RSS feeds, etc.).
19. See, e.g., Social Media and Web 2.0 in Government, WEBCONTENT.GOV, Sept. 24,
2009, available at http://www.usa.gov/webcontent/technology/other_tech.shtml (listing the
social media and new web content materials available to government agencies to make their
agency’s websites more publicly interactive).
20. See
Gov
2.0
Summit,
About
Gov
2.0
Summit,
http://www.gov2summit.com/gov2009/public/content/about (last accessed Dec. 9, 2009).
21. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Fulfilling Government 2.0’s Promise with Robust
Privacy Protections, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. ARGUENDO A-101 (2010), available at
http://groups.law.gwu.edu/LR/ArticlePDF/Arguendo_Citron.pdf (providing examples of the
Obama administration’s enthusiasm for “Government 2.0”); Charles Homans, The Geekdom
of Crowds: The Obama Administration Experiments with Data-Driven Democracy, WASH.
MONTHLY, July 1, 2009, at 13 (noting how Obama has been a “prominent champion” of
Government 2.0); Daniel Lyons & Daniel Stone, President 2.0, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 1, 2008, at
40; Micah L. Sifry & Andrew Rasiej, The Rise of Government 2.0, POLITICO.COM, May 7,
2009, available at http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0509/22185.html; David Herbert, Poll
Gives E-Government Highest Marks Ever, NATIONAL JOURNAL, Feb. 3, 2009, available at
http://www.nationaljournal.com/njonline/no_20090203_9690.php.
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longing for improved, innovative government has deep roots in our
society. The slogans may change with each generation, but the
underlying aspiration remains to achieve progress similar to that
observed in technologies that have grown out of the physical sciences.
A decade and a half ago, Al Gore championed the “reinvention of
22
government” —a name adopted from the public management book by
David Osborne and Ted Gaebler that expressly invoked the
“breathtaking change” in our current “information society” as the
23
catalyst for reforming governmental structures and practices.
In an
earlier era as well, Justice Brandeis relied on technological metaphor to
defend federalism as a means for providing “laborator[ies]” in which
24
citizens could “try novel social and economic experiments.” Brandeis
was, in turn, following in the tradition of the Progressive Era, which
relied on the vast technological changes in the nineteenth century to
justify the introduction of legal innovations at both the state and federal
25
levels. Indeed, the intellectual roots of the Progressive tradition can be
traced back to Woodrow Wilson, a prominent academic who later
became influential in politics. Wilson established the intellectual
foundation for the development of an innovative “science of
administration” by pointing to the profound technological and social
26
changes that had occurred since the framing of the Constitution.
22. See, e.g., Fewer Costs, Fewer Offices in Government ‘Reinvention,’ USA TODAY,
Oct. 14, 1994, at A4; National Archives and Records Administration, Remarks of Vice
President Al Gore, Opening Session of International Rego Conference, Jan. 14, 1999, available
at http://clinton2.nara.gov/WH/EOP/OVP/speeches/interego.html.
We are here at this extraordinary international gathering, the very first of its kind, to
talk about a subject that lies at the very heart of economic growth and
productivity—and even basic political legitimacy—for the 21st Century: reforming
and reinventing government so that it is smaller, smarter, and more responsive to
change in this fast-changing Information Age.
Id.
23. See DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT: HOW THE
ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT IS TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC SECTOR 15 (1992) (arguing that
the “bureaucratic institutions developed during the industrial era . . . increasingly fail us”
because “[w]e live in an era of breathtaking change” that has produced “an information
society, in which people get access to information almost as fast as their leaders do”).
24. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if
its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country.”).
25. See, e.g., John F. Duffy, The FCC and the Patent System: Progressive Ideals,
Jacksonian Realism, and the Technology of Regulation, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1071, 1081–84
(2000).
26. Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Administration, 2 POL. SCI. QUAR. 197, 200
(1887). To explain “the reason why we are having now what we never had before, a science
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In pursuing governmental innovation to change existing
constitutional structures, the Progressives were themselves carrying
forward the more general tradition of innovation that dates back to the
time of the framing of the Constitution. The constitutional framers
were facing one of the greatest crises of our nation, as the very structure
of the then-existing government established under the Articles of
27
Confederation was failing badly. That was a crisis of much greater
28
magnitude than the economic crisis currently faced by our nation, and
the greater crisis produced monumental innovation. Indeed, the
framers of our Constitution were not shy about telling the world that
they were experimenting. For example, James Madison, in Federalist 39,
talked about the “bold and radical innovation[s]” that he was defending,

of administration,” Wilson pointed to “difficulties of governmental action,” which had been
“gathering in other centuries” and were “culminating in our own.” Wilson argued that, in
earlier times, “[t]he functions of government were simple, because life itself was simple.” Id.
at 199. In his prior work, WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT: A STUDY
IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1885), Wilson also relied on the changes brought by the past
hundred years as the basis for reconsidering constitutional structures. See id. at 53–54
(arguing for a greater centralization of governmental power than was contemplated when the
Constitution was adopted because “[t]he Constitution was adopted when it was six days’ hard
traveling from New York to Boston; when to cross the East River was a to venture a perilous
voyage; when men were thankful for weekly mails; . . . when there were no telegraph lines,
and no monster corporations”).
27. See, e.g., CAROL BERKIN, A BRILLIANT SOLUTION: INVENTING THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 11–22 (2002) (recounting that in the years following the Declaration of
Independence, the United States confronted major difficulties due to a weak and ineffective
federal government that was unable to address rising economic discontent, to manage the
repayment of war time loans, or to resolve political disputes among the individual states). See
also GORDON S. WOOD, REVOLUTIONARY CHARACTERS: WHAT MADE THE FOUNDERS
DIFFERENT 145–46 (2006). Wood noted that the “Articles of Confederation . . . had not
created a real government” since it vested and reserved many substantive powers to the
individual states. Id. Specifically, the Articles of Confederation lacked the “crucial powers of
commercial regulation and taxation—indeed all final ordinary law making authority.” Id. at
146. See also JOSEPH J. ELLIS, AMERICAN CREATION: TRIUMPHS AND TRAGEDIES AT THE
FOUNDING OF THE REPUBLIC 91 (2007) (relating that George Washington “had grown
convinced that . . . the government established under the Articles of Confederation had
proved itself ‘a rope of sand’ and was now lurching from mere incompetence to complete
dissolution.”); SEAN WILENTZ, THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 31 (2005)
(noting that “the national government, under the loosely knit Articles of Confederation, was
so feeble that it had become nearly impossible to conduct a foreign policy, secure the nation’s
defense and complete commercial treaties, let alone settle the leftover debts from the
Revolution”).
28. See ELLIS, supra note 27, at 93 (noting that Madison was concerned that continued
inactivity regarding reforms to the Articles of Confederation would lead to “anarchy,” and
the potential for “utter chaos, widespread violence, possible civil war between or among the
states, and the likely intervention of several European powers eager to exploit the political
disarray for their own imperial purposes” in the fledging nation).

DUFFY 5-17-10

2010]

5/19/2010 2:23 PM

INNOVATION AND RECOVERY

247
29

in arguing for the adoption of the new constitution. And in Federalist
37, again, Madison also said that the act of the Constitutional
Convention had recommended so many important changes and
innovations that great care was required to understand them all and to
30
evaluate them.
While the recent economic crisis has not produced—and is not likely
to produce—dramatic constitutional innovation, it has spurred some
proposals for incremental innovation in governmental institutions. For
example, the currently proposed financial reform legislation would
authorize the creation of a new “Bureau of Consumer Financial
Protection” that (i) would be part of the Federal Reserve System (the
31
32
“Fed”), (ii) would be funded from the Fed’s revenues, (iii) would be
capable of receiving delegations of power from the Fed’s Board of
33
Governors, and yet (iv) would be independent from any substantive
34
oversight by the Fed. Thus, the proposed new Bureau is innovative in
that, while it is statutorily created as a part of another independent
agency (the Fed) and indeed receives its funding from that other agency,
it nevertheless retains a seemingly complete independence even from
that agency. The new Bureau would be an extension of the model of a
“doubly independent” agency, which involves placing an independent
agency within a larger, parent independent agency. That structure was
pioneered with the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(“PCAOB”), which Congress created as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley
legislation in 2002 and which remains subject to a constitutional

29. The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles, THE FEDERALIST NO. 39
(James Madison).
30. Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form of
Government, THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison).
It is a misfortune, inseparable from human affairs, that public measures are rarely
investigated with that spirit of moderation which is essential to a just estimate of
their real tendency to advance or obstruct the public good; and that this spirit is
more apt to be diminished than promoted, by those occasions which require an
unusual exercise of it. To those who have been led by experience to attend to this
consideration, it could not appear surprising, that the act of the convention, which
recommends so many important changes and innovations, which may be viewed in
so many lights and relations, and which touches the springs of so many passions and
interests, should find or excite dispositions unfriendly, both on one side and on the
other, to a fair discussion and accurate judgment of its merits.
Id.
31. See S. 3217, supra note 17, § 1011(a).
32. See id. § 1017(a).
33. See id. § 1012(c)(1).
34. See id. § 1012(c)(2), (3) & (4).
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challenge now pending before the Supreme Court. Yet the proposed
new Bureau goes beyond even the PCAOB, which is subject to some
degree of supervision by its parent agency, the Securities and Exchange
Commission.
In tracing this continuing tradition of governmental innovations, I do
not mean to suggest that such innovations are desirable. Innovation is
well known to be a highly risky endeavor. Though a few innovations are
wildly successful, most are failures.
So too with governmental
innovations. While the governmental structure in the U.S. Constitution
has been a tremendously successful innovation, other attempts to
produce innovative governance have not been enduring.
The
overarching point, however, is that the creative impulse to innovate
defies narrow categorization. Where social needs are great, as in a
recession, innovation is seen across numerous fields. Thus, the crisis of
recession reveals the full scope of human creativity and innovation.
B. Pragmatic Innovation
The second theme concerns innovation and pragmatism. It is
common for patent attorneys and scholars to believe that innovation is
36
directed toward pragmatic or utilitarian goals. Yet innovation does not
necessarily have to be pragmatic or useful. Pragmatic application is
absent even from many inventions that have received patents, including
for example, such novelties as the automatic hat tipper (patented in
37
38
1896) or the wearable hamster cage (patented 1999).
Innovative
forms of artwork, dance, music or humor might be pleasing and socially
desirable, but they are distinct from the pragmatic innovations that
solve pressing problems or fulfill practical needs.
35. See Free Enter. Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., cert. granted, 129 S.
Ct. 2378 (No. 08-861) (May 18, 2009).
36. See, e.g., FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, To Promote Innovation: The Proper
Balance of Competition and Patent Law and Policy, Executive Summary, 1 (October 2003),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf (“Innovation benefits consumers
through the development of new and improved goods, services, and processes . . . .
Technological breakthroughs such as automobiles, airplanes, the personal computer, the
Internet, television, telephones, and modern pharmaceuticals illustrate the power of
innovation to increase prosperity and improve the quality of our lives.”).
37. See U.S. Patent No. 556,248 (1896) (disclosing a “novel device for automatically
effecting polite salutations by the elevation and rotation of the hat on the head of the saluting
party when said person bows to the person or person saluted, the actuation of the hat being
produced by mechanism therein and without the use of the hands in any manner”).
38. See U.S. Patent No. 5,901,666 (1999) (disclosing “pet display clothing” consisting of
a wearable “vest or belt . . . with tubular, pet receiving passageways [that are] are transparent
so that a pet moving along the passageways can be seen by a spectator”).
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Recessions refocus attention on practical concerns. Indeed,
recessions frequently begin with a pragmatic and essential, but often
overlooked, form of innovation: firms lay off some portion of their
employees. Though greater unemployment is not often seen as
welcome news, it is a crucial part of the innovation that leads to
recovery. In reducing their workforces, firms are attempting to continue
production while using fewer resources or to eliminate unproductive
activities. Layoffs are thus best seen as an intensely practical type of
process innovation; they are attempts by firms to become more efficient
in their operations.
The desire for recovery is nothing more nor less than a hope that
innovation and change will improve people’s lives and make society
better off in measurable ways. Layoffs, bankruptcies, and other
economic failures are the necessary predicates toward the innovations
associated with recovery—new employments, new businesses, and new
successes. Recessions free labor and capital goods from unproductive
activities so that they can be directed toward new and more productive
uses.
In both recession and recovery, the innovations most ardently
sought by workers, firms and governments are intensely practical. In
some respects, this focus on the practical reinforces my first theme
about the diversity of innovation. In difficult times, individuals and
firms look for innovations of all sorts provided that they will yield useful
results. But the point is larger still. Recession is a time to assess the
standard practices that were yesterday’s innovations, and the assessment
is uncompromisingly pragmatic because firms must ask: Are these
current practices, operations or lines of business as efficient as possible?
Are they even worth continuing? Recovery begins when the current
inefficiencies have been eliminated, thereby freeing resources to be
employed in new pursuits.
The intense pragmatism fostered by recession is, I will argue, an
approach that is urgently needed in reevaluating the legal doctrine
associated with our nation’s patent system. Just as periodic recessions
trigger coldly practical assessments of economic practices, so too our
standard legal practices should regularly undergo such uncompromising
assessments. Now is a good time for one in the patent field.
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III. RECOVERY AND INNOVATION
The remainder of my talk will focus on the patent system. For you
who are aficionados of the patent system, here is your part of the
lecture.
The first part of this talk set the stage for an evaluation of the patent
system not only because the patent system is designed to foster the
innovation that can be so crucial to economic recovery and growth, but
also because the patent system itself is now widely viewed as being in
crisis. Recent books on the patent system come under titles such as
39
40
“Innovation and its Discontents” or “Patent Failure.” These books
do not praise the current direction of the patent system, but instead
41
question whether the system needs dramatic reform.
Dissatisfaction with the status quo in the patent system is not limited
to the pages of academic books and articles. For the better part of the
last decade, Congress has continually been considering major patent
42
43
reform legislation.
While nothing has yet been enacted, the new
39. ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW
OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND
WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2004).
40. JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (2008). Bessen and Meurer’s
book has inspired significant scholarship, with an issue of the Journal of Intellectual Property
Law dedicated solely to publishing academic responses to the book’s conclusions. See 16 J.
INTELL. PROP. L., vol. 1 (2008).
41. See Recent Publications, 122 HARV. L. REV. 835, 836 (2008) (summarizing “Patent
Failure”); Sandra Chartrand, In a Forthcoming Book, Two Professors Make Suggestions on
Reinventing the Patent System, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2004, at C4 (discussing “Innovation and
its Discontents”).
42. Congress has proposed at least eight versions of patent reform in the past five
years. See, e.g., Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th Cong. (Mar. 3, 2009); Patent Reform
Act of 2009, S. 610, 111th Cong. (Mar. 17, 2009); Patent Reform Act of 2009, H.R.1260, 111th
Cong. (Mar. 3, 2009); Patent Reform Act of 2008, S. 3600, 110th Cong. (Sept. 25, 2008);
Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th Cong. (Apr. 18, 2007); Patent Reform Act of 2007,
H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (Apr. 18, 2007); Patent Reform Act of 2006, S. 3818, 109th Cong.
(Aug. 3, 2006); Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (June 8, 2005).
43. Patent reform was closest to reality in 2007, when the House of Representatives
passed its version of the Patent Reform Act of 2007 (H.R. 1908). See Lisa Friedman, House
Passes Patent Reforms; Bill Supported by Tech Industry, DAILY NEWS (LOS ANGELES), Sept.
8, 2007, at B1; Tom Ramstack, Firms Call Patent Reform Bill Too Weak; Say It Increases
Incentive to Steal Inventions, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2007, at C9. Despite having S. 525
calendared for debate, ultimately the Senate was unable to pass their version of patent reform
prior to the conclusion of the 110th session of Congress, leaving proponents of substantive
revisions to the existing Patent Laws to start the process over again. See Michael J. Schallop,
Hedging on the Scope of Patentable Subject Matter for Business Methods—The Potential
Broader Implications of In re Bilski, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, July 2008, at 36; Methods and
Madness; America’s Patent System, THE ECONOMIST, May 10, 2008.
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administration is promising to do all it can to end that inaction relatively
44
soon.
Unlike in Congress, patent reform has become a reality at the
Supreme Court. In the last half decade, the Court has also been
45
reevaluating and changing the status quo in patent law.
KSR v.
46
Teleflex, a case I had some involvement in, overturned a quarter of
century of lower court precedent on the standard of patentability and,
47
by endorsing a more capacious obviousness doctrine, made it
48
somewhat more difficult to obtain a patent. In Medimmune v.
Genentech, the Supreme Court ruled that more than two decades worth
of Federal Circuit case law had overly restricted the ability of parties to
49
bring declaratory judgment actions to challenge patents. Similarly,

44. See George Best, Stephen B. Maebius, Jeanne M. Gills, Philip G. Kiko & Jonathan
W. Dudas, The Obama Administration Weighs In On Patent Reform Legislation: Will The
Logjam Break?, MONDAQ BUS. BRIEFING, Oct. 14, 2009; Gary Locke, Opinion: Congress
Must Pass Patent Reform, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Oct. 7, 2009.
45. See, e.g., Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109 (2008);
Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007); KSR Int’l v. Teleflex, 550 U.S. 398
(2007); MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 137 (2007); eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006); Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545
U.S. 193 (2005).
46. KSR, 550 U.S. at 404 (listing counsel in the case for petitioner KSR); see also John
F. Duffy, KSR v. Teleflex: Predictable Reform of Patent Substance and Procedure in the
Judiciary, 106 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 34, 35–36 (2007), available at
http://www.michiganlawreview.org/firstimpressions/vol106/duffy.pdf (discussing the author’s
involvement in KSR).
47. The Supreme Court in KSR rejected Federal Circuit precedents, which required a
rigid framework, in favor of “an expansive and flexible approach” in determining whether an
invention was obvious in light of the prior art. KSR, 550 U.S. at 415–18. Previously, the
Federal Circuit, had required that a determination of obviousness based on a combination of
existing prior art references should include a “teaching motivation or suggestion” to combine
such references. See, e.g., Pro-Mold v. Great Lakes Plastics, 75 F.3d 1568, 1573 (Fed. Cir.
1996) (“It is well-established that before a conclusion of obviousness may be made based on a
combination of references, there must have been a reason, suggestion, or motivation to lead
an inventor to combine those references.”); ACS Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Montefiore Hosp., 732
F.2d 1572, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
48. See, e.g., Leapfrog Enters. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(affirming the use of a common sense, flexible approach to find obviousness); Ball Aerosol &
Specialty Container, Inc. v. Limited Brands, Inc., 555 F.3d 984 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (applying
KSR’s rationale in affirming the district court’s finding that the patent at issue was an obvious
combination of existing features). See also Joshua D. Sarnoff & Christopher M. Holman,
Recent Developments Affecting the Enforcement, Procurement, and Licensing of Research
Tool Patents, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1299, 1343–46 (2008) (noting that the Supreme
Court’s KSR opinion and the flexible approach for determining obviousness may make it
easier for the USPTO to reject patentability of many inventions).
49. See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 132 n.11 (2007) (rejecting
Federal Circuit case law that had required parties challenging patents in Declaratory
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eBay v. MercExchange held that longstanding Federal Circuit standards
for awarding injunctive relief were improperly slanted toward
50
patentees.
While some of these Supreme Court cases have focused on
procedural, jurisdictional and remedial issues, the cases are united in
their rejection of Federal Circuit rulings held to be overly favorable to
patent holders. It would be wrong, however, to assume that the
dissatisfaction with the status quo and the movement for patent reform
are grounded in hostility to patents and the patent system. Rather,
current legal doctrine has bred dissatisfaction because the law has lost
its focus on two traditional values of the patent system: generous
accommodation for the extreme diversity of innovation and
uncompromising pragmatism in building and refining patent law’s
doctrines. Below I set forth four examples as illustrations.
A. Claim Interpretation
My first example involves a highly technical issue, patent claim
interpretation. A patent claim is a single sentence at the very end of the
patent document that tries to define, with some degree of precision, the
scope of the intellectual property rights encompassed within the
51
patent. Claims are now commonly called the “metes and bounds” of
Judgment Actions to establish that they had a “reasonable apprehension of suit”). See also
SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(acknowledging that the Supreme Court’s decision in MedImmune had rejected the circuit’s
longstanding rule requiring a “reasonable apprehension of suit” as a prerequisite to
declaratory judgment jurisdiction); Jervis B. Webb Co. v. Southern Systems, Inc., 742 F.2d
1388, 1398 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (early case articulating the “reasonable apprehension” of suit as a
requirement for declaratory judgment jurisdiction).
50. The Court rejected a “‘general rule,’ unique to patent disputes, ‘that a permanent
injunction will issue once infringement and validity have been adjudged.’” 547 U.S. at 394
(disapproving of the analysis in MercExchange, LLC v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1338 (Fed.
Cir. 2005)). Instead, “the decision whether to grant or deny injunctive relief . . . must be
exercised consistent with traditional principles of equity, in patent disputes no less than in
other cases governed by such standards.” Id. at 394.
51. See 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2 (2006) (“The specification shall conclude with one or more
claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant
regards as his invention.”). See also U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF
PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 608.01(m) (8th ed. rev. 7 2008) (“While there is no set
statutory form for claims, the present Office practice is to insist that each claim must be the
object of a sentence.”); Fressola v. Manbeck, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1211, 1214–15 (D.D.C.
1995) (holding that the PTO’s requirement that claims must be written in one sentence
format was procedural in nature and thus was a limitation that could be imposed by the
PTO). See also Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996)
(recognizing the claim as “the portion of the patent document that defines the scope of the
patentee’s rights”).
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52

the property rights conferred by the patent.
In the last two decades, a theory has arisen that I believe to be quite
pernicious. It was best articulated by a colleague of Judge Nies, Judge
Giles Rich of the Federal Circuit. He said: “[t]he name of the game is
53
the claim.”
In other words, the whole “game” in patent law (or
perhaps more narrowly, patent infringement law) is the set of words
written into the sentence of the patent document called the claim.
Though many professors have cited it to emphasize the importance
54
of patent claims, Judge Rich’s catchy slogan is, I believe, dead wrong.
The name of the game in patent law should always be innovation, not
some legalistic construct such as claims. Claims are for lawyers, and
lawyers should be the servants of the innovators, not the masters. Judge
Rich’s slogan is a perfect example of how our current patent system has
departed from an unswervingly pragmatic focus on the proper goal of
the entire patent system—innovation—and instead has become overly
concerned with legalisms for legalisms sake.
Returning the law to a more pragmatic focus on encouraging
innovation will require a major theoretical shift in patent law. It is,
however, a shift worth making and actually requires nothing more
radical than reviving more traditional approaches such as that embraced
by the Supreme Court in its 1923 decision Eibel Process Co. v.
55
Minnesota & Ontario Paper Co. In that case, the Court emphasized
that, to determine the proper scope of a patent, courts should “first
look[] into the art to find out what the real merit of the alleged
56
discovery or invention is.” I love that approach. Merit—judged not by
52. See, e.g., Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1257
(Fed. Cir. 1989). The analogy to the “metes and bounds” of a property deed may be
unfortunate because it suggests a degree of precision that is demonstrably not obtainable in
defining the scope of most patents.
53. Hon. Giles S. Rich, The Extent of the Protection of and Interpretation of Claims—
American Perspectives, 21 INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 497, 499 (1990).
54. See, e.g., F. Scott Kieff, The Case for Registering Patents and the Law and
Economics of Present Patent-Obtaining Rules, 45 B.C. L. REV. 55, 102 (2003); Mark A.
Lemley, The Changing Meaning of Patent Claim Terms, 104 MICH. L. REV. 101, 102 (2005);
Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of Claim Interpretation, 14 HARV. J. LAW & TECH. 2, 3 (2000);
Kristen Osenga, Linguistics and Patent Claim Construction, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 61, 63 (2006).
55. 261 U.S. 45 (1923).
56. Id. at 63. The complete quotation reads:
In administering the patent law the court first looks into the art to find what the real
merit of the alleged discovery or invention is and whether it has advanced the art
substantially. If it has done so, then the court is liberal in its construction of the
patent to secure to the inventor the reward he deserves. If what he has done works
only a slight step forward and that which he says is a discovery is on the border line
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legalisms but by the degree of real inventive accomplishment in the
art—is, or at least should be, the name of the game in patent law.
The Eibel Court’s approach is thoroughly pragmatic in that it
focuses on the ultimate goal sought be accomplished in patent law.
Eibel instructs courts first to look to the art, not to the claim, and then
to determine the real merit of the invention. Only after that inquiry is
complete can a court construe the legal limits of the patent rights. In
other words, the legal analysis should be subservient to a pragmatic
inquiry into real merit—not, as it so often seems today, the other way
around.
A corollary of Eibel’s approach is that courts should always try to
57
construe a patent claim to save its validity. The theory behind this
canon is consistent with Eibel’s focus on real merit. If an inventor has
made a meritorious contribution, then all of claim interpretation should
be directed to protecting that contribution, with courts doing whatever
they can in construing the ambiguities of the claim to save its validity.
In recent years, however, the Federal Circuit has said that this canon of
58
construction is “a last resort, not a first principle.”
While that
demotion of one canon of claim construction may seem to be a minor
“down-in-the-weeds” change to patent doctrine, it is a perfect example
of the more fundamental problem: recent patent doctrine is losing the
traditional, pragmatic focus on inventive merit and replacing it with an
unproductive emphasis on legalisms. An excellent and eminently
achievable reform of current patent law—one that would help in patent
law’s recovery—would be to restore the traditional emphasis on
interpreting patents to save validity and to capture the merit of the
innovation.
between mere mechanical change and real invention, then his patent, if sustained,
will be given a narrow scope and infringement will be found only in approximate
copies of the new device.
Id.
57. See, e.g., Turrill v. Michigan Southern & Northern Indiana Railroad, 68 U.S. 491,
510 (1863) (holding that claims “are, if practicable, to be so interpreted as to uphold and not
to destroy the right of the inventor”); Rhine v. Casio, Inc., 183 F.3d 1342, 1345 (Fed. Cir.
1999) (acknowledging this canon of claim interpretation).
58. See, e.g., MBO Labs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 474 F.3d 1323, 1332 (Fed.
Cir. 2007) (“[V]alidity construction should be used as a last resort, not a first principle: ‘we
have limited the maxim [that claims are to be construed to preserve validity] to cases in which
the court concludes, after applying all the available tools of claim construction, that the claim
is still ambiguous.’”); Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“While we
have acknowledged the maxim that claims should be construed to preserve their validity, we
have not applied that principle broadly, and we have certainly not endorsed a regime in which
validity analysis is a regular component of claim construction.”).

DUFFY 5-17-10

2010]

5/19/2010 2:23 PM

INNOVATION AND RECOVERY

255

Another example of the same problem is the recent hostility of the
lower courts to the doctrine of equivalents. In patent infringement suits,
our country’s traditional approach was that, if a claim had some
literalistic problem, courts would permit patentees to rely on the
“doctrine of equivalents” to cover as infringements those things that
59
were equivalent, if not literally identical, to what was claimed. In other
words, the courts applied a pragmatic rule of forgiveness in interpreting
60
To be sure, the rule was not perfectly forgiving, but it
claims.
nonetheless permitted some degree of forgiveness to account for the
realistic difficulties associated with drafting language to cover the new
and nonobvious.
The most dramatic attempt to restrict the doctrine of equivalents
came in the Federal Circuit’s en banc ruling in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., which purported to make the doctrine
61
of equivalents inapplicable to all amended claim elements.
The
Supreme Court’s decision in Festo rejected that “rigid” rule and also
62
warned against the dangers of excessive “literalism” in patent law. Yet
even after the Supreme Court’s Festo decision, the Federal Circuit has
63
continued to constrict the doctrine of equivalents. Now, more than
59. See Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. 330, 343 (1854).
Patentees sometimes add to their claims an express declaration, to the effect that the
claim extends to the thing patented, however its form or proportions may be varied.
But this is unnecessary. The law so interprets the claim without the addition of these
words. The exclusive right to the thing patented is not secured, if the public are at
liberty to make substantial copies of it, varying its form or proportions.
Id.; Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608–09 (1950) (noting the
history and development of the doctrine of equivalents); Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton
Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 28 (1997) (“The lengthy history of the doctrine of equivalents
strongly supports adherence to our refusal in Graver Tank to find that the Patent Act
conflicts with that doctrine.”).
60. See, e.g,, Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 946 (Fed. Cir.
1987) (remarking that the “equitable doctrine of equivalents . . . ‘has been consistently
applied by [the Supreme Court] and the lower federal courts . . . when the proper
circumstances for its application arise.’ (citation omitted) . . . . In these more than 130 years of
jurisprudence there have indeed arisen instances of judicial interpretation of claims beyond
their literal boundaries, in the interest of justice. The view that such judicial flexibility should
not exist is contrary to these decades of decisions, and appears to be contrary to that good
judgment which underlies our precedents.”).
61. 234 F.3d 558, 563–64 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc) (setting forth the court’s holding),
rev’d, 535 U.S. 722 (2002).
62. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 738 (2002).
63. O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1364–66 (Fed.
Cir. 2008) (interpreting the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel broadly to foreclose
application of the doctrine of equivalents); Honeywell Int’l v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp.,
370 F.3d 1131 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc) (same); Johnson & Johnston Assocs. v. R.E. Serv.
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seven years after the Supreme Court’s decision in Festo, it is common
knowledge among patent practitioners and scholars that the doctrine of
64
equivalents has been effectively eradicated.
The demise of the doctrine of equivalents is a shame, for it is
another step toward the fallacy that the “name of the game” should be
what the lawyer writes in a claim and not what the inventor does in a
laboratory. The natural reaction to restrictions on equivalents analysis
65
has been to add more claims to patents. If courts will not interpret
patents in a reasonably forgiving manner to protect inventions of real
merit—if semantic nuances can cost inventors effective protection over
their inventions—then inventors’ lawyers will try to compensate by
drafting more and more claims to cover a wide variety of possible
66
semantic permutations.
This is not a positive development in patent law. It means more
work for lawyers drafting patent applications, as they will spend time
drafting dozens and perhaps even hundreds of claims per patent
application. The abundance of claims will not, however, increase the
certainty of the intellectual property rights. The chief criticism against
the doctrine of equivalents has long been that the doctrine makes patent
infringement analysis somewhat amorphous and therefore somewhat
67
less predictable. Yet applying the doctrine of equivalents to a small
Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc) (holding that the doctrine of equivalents
cannot be applied to cover equivalents that were “disclosed but unclaimed” in the patent).
64. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The (Unnoticed) Demise of the Doctrine of
Equivalents, 59 STAN. L. REV. 955, 958 (2007) (empirically documenting the death of the
doctrine of equivalents); Charles W. Adams, The Doctrine of Equivalents: Becoming a
Derelict on the Waters of Patent Law, 84 NEB. L. REV. 1113 (2006); John R. Thomas, Claim
Re-Construction: The Doctrine of Equivalents in the Post-Markman Era, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 153, 154 (2005) (recognizing “the increasing disdain with which the Federal Circuit has
viewed arguments of equivalent infringement”).
65. See Mark R. Hull, Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.: A Fog
Between the Bars, 37 AKRON L. REV. 339, 371–72 (2004) (“As a result [of the limitations on
the doctrine of equivalents], the cost to the patentee will increase as patent lawyers must
consider drafting narrow claims, drafting longer claims to cover all foreseeable equivalents,
and spending more time researching the technology and fine tuning language.”).
66. See, e.g., Festo Corp., 234 F.3d at 624 (Rader, J., dissenting) (noting that the en
banc court’s new limitation on the doctrine of equivalents “will substantially increase the cost
of obtaining patent protection, and may in fact become prohibitively high for individual
inventors and start-up companies . . . [since it would] require applicants to file in an original
application numerous ‘narrow’ claims.”). See also, Glen P. Belvis, An Analysis of the En
Banc Decision in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. and the Doctrine of
Equivalents, 11 FED. CIR. B.J. 59, 101 (2001) (noting that, as the doctrine of equivalents is
narrowed, patent attorneys would respond by drafting patents containing “claims of as many
different types, styles, and scopes as is practical.”).
67. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1538 (Fed. Cir.
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number of claims may produce more certainty than applying rigidly
literal interpretations to hundreds of claims, which can be the situation
that litigants face today. More importantly, the multiplication of claims
directs attention away from the merits of the underlying invention.
In sum, the slogan “the name of the game is the claim” is an
excellent illustration of how current patent doctrine has lost its
traditional, pragmatic focus on meritorious invention. The path toward
recovery offers a different slogan: “the name of game is invention.”
B. The Paper Patent Doctrine
My second example also involves a modern development that has
taken the patent system away from its traditional pragmatism by
distancing it from important business realities. There used to be a
doctrine in patent law known as the “paper patent” doctrine. This neat
68
little doctrine is now an historical remnant. It has been buried by the
69
courts, mostly in the last half-century. Yet this doctrine was based on
the realistic view that, if an alleged invention has been merely disclosed
in a patent specification but never actually implemented in the real

1995) (Plager, J., dissenting) (arguing that the doctrine of equivalents would have the effect of
disrupting the public disclosure requirement and the underlying policy doctrines associated
with this requirement would all “thrown into disarray by this unpredictable aspect of current
patent litigation”). See also Martin J. Adelman, The New World of Patents Created by the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 979, 996 (1987) (noting
that the doctrine of equivalents “has the potential to overwhelm the peripheral claiming
system . . . [would result in] no way to determine with reliability prior to suit whether or not
one is infringing another’s patent.”); M. Scott Boone, Defining and Refining the Doctrine of
Equivalents: Notice and Prior Art, Language and Fraud, 43 IDEA 645, 658 (2003) (“The
doctrine of equivalents has been criticized on several related grounds: the unpredictability
caused by the lack of a precise linguistic framework for the doctrine; the harm that the
doctrine causes the notice function of the claims; the unpredictable results reached by juries
that decide the issue of equivalents.”).
68. See Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, Intellectual Property for Market
Experimentation, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 337, 401–02 (2008) (noting that “the paper patent
doctrine has fallen out of favor”).
69. For instance, since the creation of the Federal Circuit in 1982, the term “paper
patent” appears in only two published decisions. See UMC Elec. Co. v. U.S., 816 F.2d 647,
664–65 (Fed. Cir. 1987); In re Johnson, 747 F.2d 1456, 1461 (Fed. Cir. 1984). In the past thirty
years, only seven district court cases mentioning the paper patent doctrine have been
published in the Federal Supplement Reporter. See Wooster Brush Co. v. Newell Operating
Co., 46 F. Supp. 2d 713, 721–22 (N.D. Ohio 1999); Monovis, Inc. v. Aquino, 905 F. Supp. 1205,
1226 (W.D.N.Y. 1994); State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 639 F. Supp. 937, 951 (E.D.
Tenn. 1986); Carella v. Starlight Archery, 595 F. Supp. 613, 617 (E.D. Mich. 1984); JohnsManville Corp. v. Guardian Indus. Corp., 586 F. Supp. 1034, 1068 (E.D. Mich. 1983);
Studiengesellschaft Kohle mbH v. Dart Indus., Inc., 549 F. Supp. 716, 757 (D. Del. 1982);
Wycoff v. Motorola, Inc., 502 F. Supp. 77, 92 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
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world, then it remains only a piece of paper. The courts would look
upon that such a patent with some degree of skepticism, almost as if the
invention were half complete. The doctrine did not, however, mean that
courts would never hold paper patents to be valid, but they were more
likely to construe such patents narrowly or, at times, to hold them
71
invalid. In this respect, the paper patent doctrine could be seen as
somewhat anti-patent because it would create difficulties for some
patentees who were trying to enforce such patents.
The doctrine had another face too, one that favored patentees. For
those who held more than just a paper patent—for those who had gone
out in the real world and built a business around an invention—the
paper patent doctrine was a great help in sustaining the validity of the
patent. If a competitor tried to invalidate such a patent based on older
patents that had never been implemented, then the paper patent
doctrine could be used to discount those older patents and limit the
72
extent that they would be viewed as potentially invalidating prior art.
70. 4 ANTHONY DELLER, DELLER’S WALKER ON PATENTS, § 229, at 78 (2d ed. 1965)
(recognizing that “[n]on-use of a patented invention may result in . . . the patent [being]
declared a mere “paper” patent and entitled to a narrow interpretation”); Abramowicz &
Duffy, supra note 68, at 401–03 (“Under the ‘paper patent’ doctrine, U.S. courts have in the
past distinguished between patents that remain merely pieces of paper issued by a
government agency and those that are made into commercial products.”).
71. Thompson v. Dernell Potato Prods. Co. v. Snelling, 38 F.2d 788, 789 (2d Cir. 1930)
(“The appellant’s patent has not been put to commercial use, and therefore it is not entitled
to a construction of any broader scope than it is clearly required to be given.”); Dillon Co. v.
Cont’l Supply Co., 98 F.2d 581, 587 (10th Cir. 1938).
[N]either Dillon nor his assignee nor anyone by their consent during those nine
years had used, made or sold a patented device constructed in accordance with his
specification, claims and patent drawings . . . . That has been said to render the
patent a mere paper patent, entitled to a narrow interpretation when thereafter sued
on for infringement.
Id.; Richard Irvin & Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 121 F.2d 429, 430 (2d Cir. 1941)
(“The patent has never gone into use; manual pressure retaining valves are still part of the
equipment of the A.B. Brake; and we should not be warranted in giving the claims any but
the most meager range of equivalents.”).
72. Kings County Raisin v. U.S. Consol., 182 F. 59, 62–63 (9th Cir. 1910).
The Crosby invention undoubtedly anticipates . . . [and] describes the whole theory
of the Pettit patent; but it does not appear ever to have been put to use, and there is
no evidence that any machine was ever constructed under it . . . . It would seem that
it was one of those unsuccessful and abandoned inventions which are held to have
no place in the art to which they relate.
Id.; Wahl Clipper Corp. v. Andis Clipper Co., 66 F.2d 162, 165 (7th Cir. 1933) (“It is more
important to study those developments of the art which are bright with use in the channels of
trade than to delve into abandoned scrap heaps and dust-covered books which tell of hopes
unrealized and flashes of genius quite forgotten.”). See also The Paper Patent Rule in the
Patent Office, 29 J. PAT. OFF. SOCY. 599 (1947).
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One result of the modern demise of the paper patent doctrine has
been the rising controversy concerning what are known as “patent
trolls” or, in less derogatory terms, “non-practicing entities,” which are
patentees that have never commercially implemented their technology
but that are suing others who have taken the business risk to implement
73
the technology.
A revival of the paper patent doctrine would be
poison to patent trolls, but good news for patent holders who actually
changed things in the real world. The old paper patent doctrine
recognized the enormous business risks firms take in commercializing
new technologies, and it made that risk-taking count for something in
the patent system. That approach was eminently reasonable and
pragmatic. True patent reform would revitalize the doctrine.
C. Diversity of Innovation and Accommodation of Pioneers
My last two examples show ways in which current legal doctrine has
lost the traditional ability of patent law to accommodate the extreme
diversity of innovation. In the past, courts used to discuss whether an
invention should be considered a “pioneer” invention or “mere
74
improvement.” That distinction was important to the courts precisely
because they were trying to discern the real merit of the contribution by
73. See, e.g., David W. Opderbeck, Patent Damages Reform and the Shape of Patent
Law, 89 B.U. L. REV. 127, 130 (2009) (defining the concept of “a non-practicing entity, or
‘patent troll,’ [to be a firm] that has no business model except to collect and license patents”).
The term “patent troll” has even migrated into the mainstream press. See, e.g., Joe Nocera,
Tired of Trolls, A Feisty Chief Fights Back, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2008, at C1 (noting that the
patent troll’s typical business model involves “acquir[ing] patents, often from bankrupt
companies—and often overly broad patents that should never have been issued by the United
States Patent and Trademark Office in the first place . . . [and instead] of using them to build
a commercial product, they extract licensing fees from companies that are making and selling
real products.”).
74. See, e.g., Westinghouse v. Boyden Power Brake Co., 170 U.S. 537, 561 (1898).
To what liberality of construction these claims are entitled depends to a certain
extent upon the character of the invention, and whether it is what is termed in
ordinary parlance a “pioneer.” This word, although used somewhat loosely, is
commonly understood to denote a patent covering a function never before
performed, a wholly novel device, or one of such novelty and importance as to mark
a distinct step in the progress of the art, as distinguished from a mere improvement
or perfection of what had gone before.
Id.; Doble Eng’g Co. v. Leeds & Northrup Co., 134 F.2d 78, 84 (1st Cir. 1943) (“A patent
covering what is called a pioneer invention, that is, one covering a wholly novel device, or one
of such novelty and importance as to mark a long step forward in the progress of the art to
which it appertains, is to be construed liberally.”); Swanson v. Unarco Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d
664, 669 (10th Cir. 1973) (“[A] pioneer or primary patent . . . must be given a broad and
liberal construction which should not be limited to the precise device and instrumentality
shown.”).
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the inventor.
While the distinction between pioneering and incremental
inventions was frequently used by the Supreme Court and by lower
courts in the nineteenth century and in the earlier part of the twentieth
century, it has all but disappeared from modern jurisprudence,
76
particularly at the Federal Circuit. This is a real loss because, if the
courts do not know what the true merit of the invention is, they will
have great difficulty applying the patent system fairly. The distinction
between pioneering and incremental inventions recognizes the full
breadth of diversity in inventions. Some inventions are larger, more
difficult, and more path-breaking than others.
A great example of the proper use of the “pioneer” concept comes
77
in Wright v. Paulhan. The case involved a suit by the Wright Brothers
to enforce their famous patent on a flying machine. The opinion was
written by Judge Learned Hand, one of the greatest judges in the
75. See, e.g., Sessions v. Romadka, 145 U.S. 29, 45 (1892) (“In view of the fact that . . .
[the patentee] was a pioneer in the art of making a practical metallic trunk fastener, and
invented a principle which has gone into almost universal use in this country, we think he is
entitled to a liberal construction of his claim.”); Cimiotti Unhairing Co. v. Am. Fur Refining
Co., 198 U.S. 399, 406 (1905).
It is well settled that a greater degree of liberality and a wider range of equivalents
are permitted where the patent is of a pioneer character than when the invention is
simply an improvement, may be the last and successful step, in the art theretofore
partially developed by other inventors in the same field.
Id.; Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 415 (1908) (noting
that while pioneer patents were to be given wider latitude under the doctrine of equivalents,
the extent to which the inventor contributed to the relevant art was also a significant factor in
determining the scope of invention); Black, Sivalls & Bryson, Inc. v. Nat’l Tank Co., 445 F.2d
922, 925 (10th Cir. 1971) (holding that “infringement is not a mere matter of words . . . [but
rather] the test is whether the accused device and the device covered by the patent do the
same work in substantially the same way to accomplish substantially the same result . . . . A
primary or pioneer patent . . . is to be given a broad and liberal construction and, also, a
broad and liberal range of equivalence and it is not to be limited to the precise device and
instrumentality disclosed.”).
76. The Federal Circuit’s view seems to be that courts do not need to consider the
distinction because pioneers can draft broader claims, while incremental improvers will have
to keep their claims narrow to avoid prior art. See Augustine Med., Inc. v. Gaymar Indus.,
181 F.3d 1291, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
Pioneers enjoy the benefits of their contribution to the art in the form of broader
claims. Without extensive prior art to confine and cabin their claims, pioneers
acquire broader claims than non-pioneers who must craft narrow claims to evade
the strictures of a crowded art field. Thus, claim scope itself generally supplies
broader exclusive entitlements to the pioneer.
Id. Once again, this approach tends to emphasize the literal scope of the claims, and to
deemphasize the traditional inquiry into the merits of the invention.
77. Wright Co. v. Paulhan, 177 F. 261 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1910) [hereinafter Wright Co.].

DUFFY 5-17-10

2010]

5/19/2010 2:23 PM

INNOVATION AND RECOVERY

261
78

twentieth century and also one of the greatest patent judges ever. A
key issue in the case was whether the Wright Brothers’ patent covered
aircraft that were more modern than ones created and patented by the
Wrights.
The Wrights had discovered and patented an aircraft with a
particular type of system to “balance” the aircraft and thereby to
achieve stability in flight. Under the Wrights’ system, an aircraft could
be stabilized, in part, by warping the aircraft’s wings—i.e., by “moving
the lateral portions [of the wing] into different angular relations to the
79
normal plane of the [wing].”
That balancing act was not all that
needed to be done. The Wrights also realized that, when an aircraft did
this balancing act—i.e., when a portion of the wing on one side of the
aircraft was bent down and a portion of the wing on the other side of the
craft was bent up to rebalance the aircraft dynamically—the aircraft also
80
needed to make a rudder correction. If the rudder correction was not
81
made, the aircraft would go into a tailspin and crash. The rudder
correction was an important part of the Wrights’ aircraft design and was
essential for maintaining stability in the aircraft.
The legal issue arose because, as disclosed in their patent, the
Wrights’ aircraft design used a rope and pulley system that would
automatically make the necessary rudder correction every time the
wings were warped. Thus, under the Wrights’ claimed system, the pilot
would concentrate on warping the wings to balance the aircraft, while
the rudder would automatically make the proper correction. The
78. Id. at 261. See also KATHRYN GRIFFITH, JUDGE LEARNED HAND AND THE ROLE
FEDERAL JUDICIARY 5–13 (1973) (noting Learned Hand’s judicial record and
accolades); Hon. Henry F. Friendly, Learned Hand: An Expression from the Second Circuit,
29 BROOKLYN L. REV. 6 (1962) (“No oracular gifts are required for the prophecy that when
the history of American law in the first half of this century comes to be written, four Judges
will tower above the rest—Holmes, Brandeis, Cardozo and Learned Hand.”); James Oakes,
Special Book Section: Personal Reflections on Learned Hand and the Second Circuit, 47 STAN.
L. REV. 387 (1995). For evaluations of Learned Hand’s prowess as a patent judge, see
MARVIN SCHICK, LEARNED HAND’S COURT 166 (1970) (noting that Judge Hand “perhaps
had no peer” in the field of patent law); GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN
AND THE JUDGE 138, 306–07 (1994) (noting how Judge Hand’s opinions on patent matters
“before long achieved [him] a reputation as one of the nation’s great patent judges”); Stephen
H. Philbin, Judge Learned Hand and the Law of Patents and Copyrights, 60 HARV. L. REV.
394 (1947) (“To say that Judge Learned Hand is a great patent, copyright or common-law
judge is simple tautology—his abilities do not vary with the kind of case before him.”).
79. Wright Co., 177 F. at 262 (quoting claim 7 from the Wrights’ patent, U.S. Patent
No. 821,393 (1906)).
80. See id. at 263–64 (describing the automatic rudder correction disclosed in the
patent).
81. See id.
OF THE
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airplane of the accused infringer lacked such an automatic system.
The automatic rudder correction system had been eliminated after
the Wrights’ work because later airplane developers realized an
automatic system was unnecessary. Pilots could balance the craft and
also make appropriate rudder corrections. In fact, there were some
advantages to eliminating the automatic rudder correction system
because the pilot of the aircraft then had more freedom to control the
rudder for other maneuvers. Thus, aircraft designers after the Wrights
simply gave the airplane pilot independent control over both the wings
and the rudder. Pilots knew that if they changed the aerodynamic
profile of the aircraft’s wing to rebalance the aircraft, they also had to
make the rudder correction that the Wrights had discovered to be
essential for stability. Learning that technique was part of learning to
fly.
For purposes of patent law, however, the elimination of the
automatic rudder control system raised a very hard question. The
patent claim at issue in the Wrights’ suit included as an element a
“means” for performing the function of causing the rudder to move in
83
the proper way to account for the aerodynamic changes to the wings.
Under settled law then (as is true now), such means-plus-function claims
are construed to cover the corresponding structures disclosed in the
patent specification and equivalents. The question on infringement thus
boiled down to whether the structure disclosed by the Wright Brothers,
a rope and pulley system for making rudder corrections automatically,
was equivalent to the system of later aircraft, which required the pilot to
make the necessary rudder adjustments. In short, the question was
whether a human pilot could be viewed as equivalent to a set of ropes
84
and pulleys.
The issue initially seems like one in which the Wrights could never
expect to win. No one would ordinarily think that a set of ropes and
pulleys is equivalent to a human being. If the law reached that
conclusion, however, then the Wright Brothers would have gotten

82. Id. at 262 (“The defendant says that he does not infringe the patent because he
does not use a device which automatically always presents to the wind that side of the rudder
nearer the angle of lesser incidence.”).
83. Id. at 262 (setting forth claim 7 of the Wrights’ patent, which included as an
element a “means whereby said rudder is caused to present to the wind that side thereof
nearest the side of the aeroplane having the smaller angle of incidence and offering the least
resistance to the atmosphere”).
84. ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND
POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 821, 824–25 (4th ed. LexisNexis 2007).
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nothing from their patent, because no one was building airplanes the
way they had built their first aircraft. Conversely, if the human pilot is
an equivalent, then the Wrights’ patent would cover essentially the
entire aircraft industry. The stakes were enormously high, and there
was no real middle ground.
Learned Hand concluded that, although it relied on the pilot, the
85
subsequent rudder correction system was an equivalent.
That
conclusion is very difficult to reach as matter of linguistics or logic.
Modern doctrine, as currently applied in the lower courts, might very
well reach the opposite conclusion, which would have left the Wright
Brothers with nothing from their famous patent. Learned Hand was
able to reach a conclusion favoring the Wrights because he took into
86
account the pioneering quality of the Wrights’ work.
Indeed, the
pioneering work of the Wrights serves as the polestar of Hand’s opinion,
for he candidly acknowledges that, even with identical claim language,
the result would have been different if the Wrights’ contribution had
87
been less significant.
Modern law would be improved if courts followed Learned Hand’s
example and looked more directly and more thoroughly at the merits of
the invention in deciding how to interpret patents. Hand’s approach is
essential because patented inventions are so enormously diverse—some
are big and some are small. A reformed patent system would expend
more effort trying to figure out which is which, and those efforts would
necessarily have to look beyond on claim language to the underlying
merit of the invention.
D. Patentable Subject Matter
My fourth and final example concerns what may be the most
important patent case of the century, Bilski v. Kappos, which involves
88
patentable subject matter. This is a sort of a natural ending point for
85. Wright Co., 177 F. at 264 (concluding that it was “a fair equivalent to operate the
tiller ropes independently by a mechanism under the direct control of the aviator”).
86. Id. at 264, 267 (describing the Wright patent as a “pioneer” patent).
87. Id. at 264 (noting that “were the invention an advance over a prior art which had
progressed already to the combination without any automatic movement of the rudder, then
the claim must have been limited to the precise specifications”).
88. See Bilski v. Doll, 545 F.3d 943, 951 (2008) (en banc), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2735
(2009). The case was argued as Bilski v. Kappos, No. 08-964, on Nov. 9, 2009. See Journal of
the Supreme Court of the United States, Oct. Term 2009, at 296 (2009), available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/journal/jnl09.pdf.
[This] appeal turns on whether Applicants’ invention as claimed meets the
requirements set forth in § 101 . . . . The statute thus recites four categories of
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my lecture because this case touches upon both pragmatism and the
diversity of innovation.
The issue in the Supreme Court case is whether practical business
processes may be eligible for patenting even if they are not tied to a
particular machine and do not transform matter into a different state or
89
thing. This seemingly simple question raises many other issues, and
there are a variety of different approaches to analyzing the case. For
example, the case can be considered as an interesting test of the Court’s
methodology for statutory interpretation. The relevant statutory text
states that “any new and useful process” may be the subject of a patent,
and it also expressly defines “process” to include “process, art, or
90
method.” The government, however, argues that business processes
and methods are nonetheless outside the intended scope of the statute if
they are not tied to a particular machine and do not transform matter to
91
a different state. The government is essentially trying to impose onto
the statute a gloss not found anywhere in the statutory text, and not
recognized by the courts in two hundred years. The case can thus be
viewed as an interesting test of whether a textualist approach to

patent-eligible subject matter: processes, machines, manufactures, and compositions
of matter. It is undisputed that Applicants’ claims are not directed to a machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter. Thus, the issue before us involves what the
term “process” in § 101 means, and how to determine whether a given claim . . . is a
“new and useful process.”
Id.
89. The Federal Circuit’s en banc opinion in Bilski stated that a “claimed process is
surely patent-eligible under § 101 if: (1) it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it
transforms a particular article into a different state or thing.” Bilski, 545 F.3d at 954 (citing
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972) and Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 192
(1981)). The en banc court held that processes and methods failing to meet either of those
two alternatives are generally unpatentable. At the Supreme Court, the Petitioners in Bilski
are challenging the en banc court’s test, which is generally referred to as the “machine-ortransformation test.” For the questions presented to the Supreme Court in the case, see
http://origin.www.supremecourtus.gov/qp/08-00964qp.pdf.
90. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 100(b). See also Bilski, 545 F.3d at 951–52.
As several amici have argued, the term “process” is ordinarily broad in meaning, at
least in general lay usage. In 1952, at the time Congress amended § 101 to include
“process,” the ordinary meaning of the term was: “[a] procedure . . . [a] series of
actions, motions, or operations definitely conducing to an end, whether voluntary or
involuntary.”
Id.
91. Brief for the Respondent, Bilski v. Kappos, 2009 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 953, at
**50 (2008) (No. 08-964). The government’s brief also articulates the class of inventions it
views as unpatentable to be “methods of organizing human activity that are untethered to
technology.” Id. at 19. It is unclear whether these different formulations are meant to be
separate or identical restrictions on patentable subject matter.
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statutory interpretation will be applied to the Patent Act.
Rather than focusing matters of statutory interpretation and other
jurisprudential issues, I want to consider the Bilski case in light of the
themes of this lecture. First, let us consider the theme of diversity in
innovation. One major argument against the modern appearance of
business method patents is that few such patents were issued in the
92
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Yet if the patent system has
traditionally been accommodating of a wide and diverse range of
innovations, limiting patentable subject matter to historical categories of
innovation is highly problematic.
Indeed, the approach seems
exceptionally bad, for it invites the courts to look not to the governing
text of the statute (which Congress wisely drafted in sufficiently broad
terms to cover a diverse range of innovations), but to historical
examples of things that were patented in the past. Yet today’s
innovations are not supposed to fit yesterday’s molds. The very best of
innovations break down our preexisting conceptions and pioneer whole
new fields. The patent law should be welcoming of new and diverse
forms of innovations.
My other theme has been the patent system’s traditionally pragmatic
approach to the building of legal doctrine. The overarching tradition in
the field has been to favor the innovations that produce practical
benefits in the real world. That approach seems to be in deep tension
with the government’s hostility to patenting “methods of organizing
93
human activity that are untethered to technology.” First of all, the
government’s argument suffers from a significant degree of incoherence,
for technological processes are always about ways of arranging the
productive activities of humans. Indeed, natural processes have long
94
been held not to be patentable.
More importantly, even if the category of “methods of organizing
human activity” could be defined, the question remains why the patent
system should attempt to target that category of innovations for
95
exclusion. If a new process is practically useful, if it “would not be
96
disclosed or devised but for the inducement of a patent,” and if it can
92. Id. at **36–42 (arguing that few “patents directed to the organization of human
activities” issued in past centuries).
93. Id. at **9.
94. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (noting that Newton and
2
Einstein could not have patented natural laws such as gravity and E=mc ).
95. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (requiring that patented inventions be “useful”).
96. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 11 (1966) (interpreting the nonobviousness
requirement in 35 U.S.C. §103).
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be defined with sufficient definiteness and clarity necessary to construct
97
stable property rights, then it is very difficult to understand the
practical case for imposing a categorical exclusion to bar the process
from patent eligibility. A more pragmatic approach would care less
about whether an inventive new process fits into some preconceived
notion of what patentable inventions should look like, and more about
whether the prospect of patenting would produce practical benefits for
society.
IV. CONCLUSION
I would like to conclude by taking a look back to another Learned
Hand opinion. The case is Parke-Davis & Co. v. H. K. Mulford Co., a
decision that, while still controversial today, has nonetheless stood the
test of time and now provides a basic pillar for many biotechnology
98
patents.
The question in Parke-Davis was whether a substance naturally
occurring in the human body can be patented by someone who has
99
succeeded in extracting it from the body, isolating it, and purifying it.
That was a difficult, cutting-edge legal question, with some significant
authority suggesting that even a purified natural substance should be
97. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (requiring the disclosure of an invention “in such full, clear,
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with
which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same” and also requiring that patent
applicants “particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which [they]
regard[] as [their] invention[s]”).
98. Parke-Davis & Co. v. H. K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1911), aff’d, 196 F.
496 (2d Cir. 1912). For sources recognizing the modern importance of Parke-Davis, see, e.g.,
Thomas F. Cotter, A Burkean Perspective on Patent Eligibility, 22 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 855,
860 n.14 (2007) (acknowledging that due to the holding in Parke-Davis, “[p]roducts of nature
that have been isolated and refined from their naturally-occurring state . . . have been viewed
as patentable”); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Genetics and the Law: Patenting the Human Genome,
39 EMORY L.J. 721, 727 & n.27 (1990) (recognizing Parke-Davis as providing part of the
foundation for the patentability of purified and isolated DNA sequences); Robert P. Merges
& Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839,
903 (1990) (noting that the Parke-Davis decision affects modern biotechnology, particularly
on the patentability of synthetic versions of naturally occurring substances); John M. Golden,
Biotechnology, Technology Policy, and Patentability: Natural Products and Invention in the
American System, 50 EMORY L.J. 101, 105 n.18 (2001) (also citing Parke-Davis as providing
the foundation for patents on purified versions of naturally occurring organic molecules).
The controversial nature of Parke-Davis is well illustrated by the recent district court decision
by Judge Sweet, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. United States PTO, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
35418 (April 2, 2010), which rejected Learned Hand’s reasoning in Parke-Davis and held
unpatentable isolated DNA sequences. See id. at *126–27.
99. Parke-Davis, 189 F. at 103 (considering and rejecting the argument that a patent
may not issue on a substance distinguished by its degree of purity).

DUFFY 5-17-10

2010]

5/19/2010 2:23 PM

INNOVATION AND RECOVERY

267

viewed as identical to the naturally occurring substance and therefore
100
101
The substance at stake was adrenalin, which, of
unpatentable.
course, naturally occurs in human bodies. The inventor, Jokichi
Takamine, extracted and purified adrenalin, and his patent claimed this
purified product.
102
Judge Hand held purified adrenalin to be patentable, but more
important than the result is Hand’s reasoning. Consistent with the thenemerging approach of the legal realists, Judge Hand admonished that
“[t]he line between different substances and degrees of the same
substance”—i.e., between the patentable and the unpatentable—“is to
be drawn rather from the common usages of men than from nice
103
considerations of dialectic.”
In evaluating the actual “usages”—the
real practicalities of the case—Hand found clarity.
“Whatever
confusion the intricacy of the subject-matter causes,” Judge Hand
104
explained, “one fact stands out, which no one ought fairly to forget.”
He continued:
Before Takamine’s discovery the best experts were trying to get
a practicable form of the active principle. The uses of the gland
were so great that it became a part of the usual therapy in the
best form which was accessible. As soon as Takamine put out his
discovery, other uses practically disappeared; by that I do not
mean absolutely, but that the enormous proportion of use now is
of Takamine’s products. There has been no successful dispute as
to that; hardly indeed any dispute at all. What use remains is, so
far as the evidence shows, of the old dried glands, which every
one concedes to have been dangerous, at least for intravenous
use. All this ought to count greatly for the validity of the patent,

100. See, e.g., Am. Wood Paper Co. v. Fibre Disintegrating Co., 90 U.S. 566, 593–94
(1874).
There are many things well known and valuable in medicine or in the arts which
may be extracted from divers substances. But the extract is the same, no matter
from what it has been taken. A process to obtain it from a subject from which it has
never been taken may be the creature of invention, but the thing itself when
obtained cannot be called a new manufacture.
Id.; Ex parte Latimer, 1889 Dec. Com. Pat. 123 (rejecting a claim for the natural qualities of a
pine needle on the basis that the applicant was seeking to patent the discovery of these
properties).
101. Parke-Davis & Co., 189 F. at 97.
102. Id. at 103 (holding that “even if [the claimed invention] were merely an extracted
product without change, there is no rule that such products are not patentable”).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 114.
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and Takamine has a great start, so to speak, from such facts . . . .
[T]his is a case where he should be entitled to a lenient
construction, for he has been author of a valuable invention and
105
has succeeded where the most expert have failed.
Hand’s opinion in Parke-Davis is a perfect example of the right
approach to patent law. The opinion focuses on the practical effects and
merits of the invention. Those realities—not “nice considerations of
dialectic”—are what guided Hand in crafting the law. The opinion is
rightly famous because it resolves a seemingly difficult issue of patent
law by slicing through indeterminate, sterile legalisms, focusing on the
pragmatics of the case, and refusing to constrict the diversity of human
innovation sought to be encouraged by our patent system. Our current
patent system could use more of that approach, for it could show us the
way out of crisis and toward recovery.
Thank you.

105. Id. at 114–15.

